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The story of ‘le prêtre de Calame’ [the priest of Calama] is one that the Enlightenment 
philosophe, Denis Diderot, was particularly fond of telling and retelling.1 It involves a 
priest who would pass out, fall to the ground, and lose all feeling, such that nothing, 
not even extreme physical violence, would bring him round; and yet, though not 
breathing, he had not passed away and would later return to his senses, reporting 
that he had felt no pain. If this intriguing little tale will be the focus here, it is not 
or, at least, not only because it stages a man who is ‘transit’ [in a state of transport]; 
rather, it is because this is a tale that is itself in transit. Diderot knew the version 
of it that appears in Montaigne’s chapter I.21, ‘De la force de l’imagination’ [Of 
the Power of the Imagination],2 itself a retelling of the version told by Augustine 
in The City of God,3 which Diderot knew too, both directly and, perhaps, also 
as quoted in Arnauld and Nicole’s Logique (1662).4 To say the story is ‘in transit’ 
should not, of course, be taken to mean that it turns up unchanged in different 
texts and contexts; far from it. This is a tale that transitions as different contexts 
confer different meanings, and certain details come into sharper focus, are tweaked, 
changed, misremembered, or misread by different writers at different historical 
moments and for different ends. In fact, it would be more accurate to speak of the 
‘ “case” of the priest of Calama’ since, unlike ‘story’ or ‘tale’, the term ‘case’ more 
obviously foregrounds the writer’s work of framing his material, assembling and 
staging the elements in a particular way with a view to proving a particular point, 
be it theological, medical, or legal. And so, despite the risk of conjuring up an image 
of lost luggage, this essay is entitled ‘a case in transit’.5
In exploring the transit of this particular case, which has not to date received any 
scholarly attention, this essay seeks both to expand the minimal existing scholarship 
on Diderot and Augustine,6 and to contribute to the substantial body of existing 
work on Diderot and Montaigne.7 There is ample evidence that Diderot knew the 
Essais well; indeed he was clearly fond enough of them for his lover, Sophie Volland, 
to leave him her seven-volume edition in her will,8 and he often quotes the Essais 
with a degree of inaccuracy that suggests the familiarity of someone so secure in 
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his knowledge of the text that he has no need to check his quotations.9 Moreover, 
although Diderot’s liking for ‘la parole des autres’ [speaking other people’s words] 
is well known,10 Montaigne is a privileged ‘other’ for Diderot, whose words he 
speaks in particularly frequent and intense ways, notably in his literary self-portrait 
in the Salon de 1767, which is so saturated with Montaigne as to produce the rather 
paradoxical object that is the literary self-portrait that sounds like someone else.11 
In the instance under consideration here, Diderot’s use of Montaigne is not simple, 
however, but, rather, triangulated since he also quotes Augustine, whom Montaigne 
was likewise echoing, and he does so in ways and for purposes that require some 
careful teasing out.
Of Diderot’s various reworkings of the case, the focus here will be on that 
found in the Pensées philosophiques (1746), an early work, which, though published 
anonymously, can be said to have made Diderot’s name, for it was widely read 
across Europe and condemned to be burned by the Paris Parlement in 1747.12 
Modern scholarship has tended to neglect it, however, for, although an incendiary 
Diderot is a figure that philosophers and historians of ideas and science have been 
keen to promote, they have invested most in Diderot the materialist, the natural 
philosopher, and scientist, a figure that is absent from the Pensées philosophiques, the 
concerns of which are primarily politico-religious.13 Moreover, in their efforts to 
present Diderot as a formally innovative writer, literary historians and critics have 
tended to focus their attention on his later dialogues, such as Le Rêve de d’Alembert 
[D’Alembert’s Dream] and Le Neveu de Rameau [Rameau’s Nephew], his highly self-
ref lexive novel, Jacques le fataliste [ Jacques the Fatalist], and his invention of the new 
genre of literary art criticism in the Salons, rather than on his early use of ‘pensées’, 
despite (or perhaps because of ) the interpretive challenges raised by the disjointed 
genre.14 The present essay seeks, then, to restore the early political Diderot to view 
by examining the Pensées philosophiques — the title recalling both Pascal’s Pensées 
(1669) and Voltaire’s Lettres philosophiques (1734) — and the way in which it stages 
the case of the priest of Calama, via both Montaigne and Augustine.
At this point, Montaigne scholars might well be wondering what is going to be 
in it for them: what will this essay tell them, if anything, about Montaigne or the 
Essais? (Montaigne’s name does, after all, only appear parenthetically in my title.) 
There are two answers to that question. The first is that, insofar as the Pensées 
philosophiques offers instances of the ventriloquization of certain passages from the 
Essais, this study sheds light on a moment in the history of their reception, as well 
as a particular mode of their reception. We know that certain chapters of the Essais 
have been read with particular attention at different historical moments, as well as 
in different social and political milieux,15 and this study of the Pensées philosophiques 
offers some further evidence of what the Enlightenment chapters were, how they 
were read, and how the Enlightenment’s selective readings enabled a construction 
of Montaigne as an Enlightenment philosophe.16 The second answer is that attention 
to Diderot’s presentation of the case of the priest of Calama reveals something of 
the way in which Montaigne read Augustine, and something of the essayist’s role 
in the history of the reception of the Church Father. To date, scholarly interest 
in the role of Montaigne in the Enlightenment’s reception of Augustine has been 
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focused on Rousseau’s Confessions (1782), which played such a significant role in the 
crystallization of the notion of the self.17 Yet Montaigne was much more familiar 
with The City of God than he was with Augustine’s Confessions, although his reading 
of it has received comparatively little attention;18 and the Enlightenment Augustine 
was as much the author of The City of God as the Confessions, if not more so.19 The 
present essay argues, then, by way of an analysis of the case of the priest of Calama, 
as it is presented in the Pensées philosophiques, that Diderot read Augustine both by 
way of Montaigne and in direct contrast to the way Montaigne read Augustine. It 
demonstrates that what was, in Augustine, a theological case of the power of the 
will, becomes, in Montaigne, a pathological case of the power of the imagination, 
and that, in Diderot, the quotation of the Augustinian case in a Montaignian frame, 
taken from another chapter of the Essais, III.11, ‘Des boyteux’ [Of Cripples], enables 
Diderot to put a political case. (Being in parentheses, then, may turn out to be more 
interesting than, at first, it might look.)
1. Reading (Montaigne reading) Augustine
Montaigne’s ‘De la force de l’imagination’ opens with the essayist confessing to the 
power of his own imagination — he has only to hear someone else cough and he 
starts to get a tickle in his throat (V, p. 97; F, p. 82). This admission of suggesti-
bility is the cue for a series of interrelated anecdotes, some more striking than 
others, in which the imagination is said to be what made the bodies behave in the 
uncontrollable ways they did. The best known is, no doubt, the case, originally 
reported by Paré as a medical case,20 of a man called Germain, who had been 
known by the name of Marie until the age of 22, when she jumped over a ditch 
and sprouted male genitalia;21 but the series also includes cases of men condemned 
to death who are so afraid of the moment of execution that they are already dead by 
the time they arrive on the scaffold, of a mute so impassioned that he acquired the 
power of speech, King Dagobert’s mysterious f lesh wounds, St Francis’s stigmata, 
levitating bodies (V, pp. 98–99; F, pp. 82–83) — and a priest mentioned by Celsius 
who would remain for long periods of time ‘sans respiration et sans sentiment’ [with 
no breathing and no sensation].22 It is following this reference to Celsius’s priest 
that Montaigne observes, ‘Saint Augustin en nomme un autre’ [St Augustine names 
another one], and goes on to present his case. 23
Before we explore what Montaigne says, it must be observed that anyone familiar 
with Augustine’s version may be rather surprised to find it included by Montaigne 
in a chapter about unruly bodies,24 for Augustine had presented the case in The 
City of God as being that of a man who was, on the contrary, able to make his 
body submit to the rule of his will.25 And so in order to grasp the significance 
of Montaigne’s reframing and re-relating of the case (and, in due course, the 
significance of Diderot’s re-reframing and re-re-relating of it), we must begin by 
examining the case as presented by Augustine.
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2. The case of the ‘presbyter of Calama’
Augustine relates it in Book 14, Chapter 24, in which he makes the theological 
claim that man, before his fall into a state of sin, had perfect control over his body. 
The chapter is, no doubt, best known for its claim that Adam’s willpower was so 
perfect that he could even control the movements of his penis, which had since 
become post-lapsarian man’s most unruly member (a point seemingly confirmed 
by Marie/Germain’s surprise growth), but the chapter also contains a series of 
anecdotes or cases of modern men who, fallen though they are, are able nonetheless 
to exert some quite remarkable control over their bodies.
Augustine’s series begins with men who can wiggle their ears, swallow and then 
regurgitate an amazing number and variety of items, and fart both musically and 
without making any smell. It culminates in a case that would, he says, be thought 
quite ‘incredible’, had the events not recently been witnessed by members of the 
local church:26
Presbyter fuit quidam Restitutus nomine in paroecia Calamensis ecclesiae: qui 
quando ei placebat (rogabatur autem ut hoc faceret ab eis qui rem mirabilem 
coram scire cupiebant,) ad imitatas quasi lamentantis cuiuslibet hominis uoces, 
ita se auferebat à sensibus, et iacebat simillimus mortuo, ut non solùm uellicantes 
atque pungentes minimè sentiret, sed aliquando etiam igne ureretur admoto, 
sine ullo doloris sensu, nisi postmodum ex uulnere: non autem obnitendo, sed 
non sentiendo non mouere corpus, eo probabatur, quod tanquam in defuncto 
nullus inueniebatur anhelitus: hominum tamen uoces, si clarius loquerentur, 
tanquam de longinquo se audisse postea referebat.
[There was a presbyter, named Restitutus, in the parish of the church of 
Calama. Whenever he pleased (and he was often asked to do it by people want-
ing to witness so remarkable a phenomenon), at/to27 the sound of voices pre-
tending to wail in grief, he could make himself so insensible and lie in a state 
so resembling death that he could be pinched and pricked and even exposed 
to fire and burned without his feeling a single thing, until afterwards when his 
injuries would hurt. That his body was not motionless owing to an effort of 
resistance on his part but owing, instead, to a loss of sensitivity is proved by the 
fact that he would no more breathe than a dead man. And yet he would report 
that if people spoke particularly clearly, he could hear their voices though they 
sounded as if they were a long way off.]28
Whereas some people are special because they can fart an odourless tune, the special 
gift possessed by the presbyter of Calama is that he could make his body completely 
lifeless, and he did so, according to Augustine, not by holding his breath, which 
the reader might have thought would be the ultimate act of willpower, but, rather, 
by departing his body, leaving it behind, as is made clear in the reference to his 
reporting that the voices he could hear seemed to be a long way off. These seem, 
then, to be cases of post-lapsarian men demonstrating quite remarkable degrees of 
control over their bodies. What are we to make of them? Is Augustine suggesting 
that such cases offer some evidence of what man’s pre-lapsarian willpower might 
have been like or, even, that they are cases of men possessing some vestige of that 
power?
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Certainly that would be one way of reading Augustine’s assertion, ‘Sic ergo 
et ipse homo potuit oboedientiam etiam inferiorum habere membrorum, quam 
sua inoboed ientia perdidit. [...] Nam et hominum quorundam naturas nouimus 
multum ceteris dispares et ipsa raritate mirabiles’ [Then man himself may also have 
once received from his lower members an obedience which he lost by his own 
dis obedience. [...] We do in fact find among human beings some individuals with 
natural abilities very different from the rest of mankind and remarkable by their 
rarity].29 However, in the cases of the ear-wiggler and the melodious, odour-free 
farter, there is something of the fairground about their powers, which not even the 
addition of a penis-puppeteer to the series could make appear Adamic, with the 
result that their cases are easier to read as comic or ironic rather than as serious signs 
of man’s amazing potential.30 But is the same true of the case of the presbyter, a man 
who wills his own fall and his return? Is his case comic and ironic too?
Some sense in which he might be somewhat different to the other cases is 
suggested by the fact that he alone has a name, and that the name he has is 
significant. ‘Restitutus’ is likely to be a name taken by a convert to signal his status 
as such, and, moreover, in this instance, his name evokes the events that make up his 
case, which is to say that ‘Restitutus’ is the name of a man restored to feeling and 
consciousness, as well as to the Christian Church. Of course, such referential duality 
may, precisely, allow for comedy and irony: perhaps the name is a joke (although 
quite whom the joke is on, is not quite clear), and while it would, no doubt, be 
too much to suggest that the name implies that the case is a hoax, ‘Restitutus’ 
might, despite (or perhaps because of ) the assurance of its authenticity supplied by 
Augustine’s reference to the credible witnesses, be read as the name of a character 
in a comic tale. And yet a further twist is also possible for, although it is unlikely 
that this is the same Restitutus, also known as Possidius, Bishop of Calama, who 
was kidnapped and assaulted for having converted,31 it is nonetheless possible that 
the pinching, pricking, and burning, to which Augustine’s Restitutus was exposed, 
might, although he exposed himself to them perfectly willingly, be read as recalling 
the acts of violence to which converts were exposed in Augustine’s time. The ironic 
possibilities of the case seem to be counterbalanced or held in check by the symbolic 
politico-religious associations of his name. What exactly Restitutus is a case of thus 
seems to be rather less easy to determine than that of the ear-wiggler, although 
even his case can be read either as an amazing sign of man’s potential or as an ironic 
indication of quite how far he has fallen.
That it is, at least, in part, Restitutus’s name that makes the significance of his 
case harder to stabilize than the others in the series may also be indicated by the fact 
that Montaigne draws attention to Augustine’s act of naming. He states, we recall, 
‘Saint Augustin en nomme un autre’, and yet he omits the name himself. Perhaps 
Montaigne decided that ‘Augustine’ was the more important name of the two; 
perhaps he wished, on this occasion in the Essais, to avoid any allusion to religious 
conversion or to violence done to converts, or to avoid the possibility of any such 
allusion having anything comic about it, especially given recent events in France. 
All three are possible, at once. Yet the name is not the only unstable element in 
the case related by Augustine. A more detailed examination raises the question: 
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just how much control does Restitutus really have over his body, over his fall, his 
transit, and his return?
When read as one of the series, the case of Restitutus, regardless of the symbolic 
significance of his name, would appear to be that of a man able, entirely at will, 
to perform a pretty extreme kind of trick, one that requires quite extraordinary 
levels of self-control. Indeed the trick is so remarkable that people would come and 
request him to perform it for them; Augustine parenthetically tells us, we recall: 
‘(rogabatur autem ut hoc faceret ab eis qui rem mirabilem coram scire cupiebant)’ 
[(and he was often asked to do it by people wanting to witness so remarkable a 
phenomenon)]. Doubtless we can assume that Restitutus would indeed perform 
it at their request if he so pleased (and that he wouldn’t if he didn’t), but it is not 
obvious that he would actually ever do it if nobody wanted him to — after all, 
although it might not hurt at the time, the wounds he receives clearly do afterwards: 
‘nisi postmodum ex uulnere’ [afterwards when his injuries would hurt]. True, 
Restitutus’s self-command is not called into question by the implication that he 
would only ever actually perform it at other people’s request, but it might be by the 
fact that the performance itself relies on audience participation.
There are two different kinds of audience participation in the story, and they 
have different implications and serve different ends. What we might think of as 
extreme audience participation (the pinching, pricking, and burning) functions to 
guarantee the extraordinary nature of Restitutus’s ability, but, insofar as the pres-
byter subsequently reports hearing other people’s voices as though they were a long 
way off, it also suggests that he may be dependent on others in order to prove, 
perhaps even to himself, that he has gone into transit, once he has. (He does not 
say, for instance, that he observed his own body as if from afar.) Another kind of 
audience participation is found slightly earlier in the story, in the second of the 
two phrases that stand either side of the parentheses, and, though less extreme, its 
consequences for the case are far-reaching since it suggests that the presbyter may be 
dependent on others to go into transit in the first place. Whereas in the first phrase, 
we are told that Restitutus would do his trick ‘quando ei placebat’ [whenever he 
pleased], in the second, we read that he would do it ‘ad imitatas quasi lamentantis 
hominis voces’, a phrase in which much hinges on how we read the preposition 
‘ad’, which introduces ‘the sound of voices pretending to wail in grief ’. If we take 
it to imply a merely temporal relationship, then the presbyter’s ability to perform 
his trick ‘whenever he pleased’ is not compromised, and we understand that the 
feigned lamentations were performed either in anticipation of the trick, setting it up 
in the manner of a drum roll (albeit a strangely mournful one), or coinciding with 
it, playing along. However, if we take the preposition to imply logical precedence, 
that is to say, if we take the feigned lamentations to be a pre-condition for the 
presbyter to be able to perform his trick, then the earlier claim that he could do it 
entirely at will is called into question. Indeed Restitutus even starts to seem a little 
vulnerable — when the impersonators did their trick of sounding grief-stricken, 
was he able not to do his trick, if he didn’t want to?
That the feigned lamentations introduce further ambiguity into Restitutus’s 
case (in addition to that introduced by his name, which had already made it more 
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ambiguous than the others in the series) is confirmed by Vives, Augustine’s most 
important commentator. In his commentary, first published in 1522, Vives reports 
that a copy in the Carmelite library in Bruges gives a variant (not of the preposition 
but of the verb form following it) that would make it possible to ascribe the 
impersonation of the lamentations to the presbyter himself, placing him firmly in 
control of every element of the trick.32 Vives does not himself adopt the Bruges 
variant (and nor will Montaigne, although we know he read Augustine in an 
edition containing Vives’s commentary)33 — but some later commentators would,34 
though not uncontroversially.35 A more drastic solution to the ambiguity over the 
strength and independence of the presbyter’s will is offered by Arnauld and Nicole, 
who simply omit any reference to the feigned lamentations from their vernacular 
gloss on the passage in the Logique, which reads, ‘toutes les fois qu’il vouloit, [il] 
s’aliénoit tellement de sens, qu’il demeuroit comme mort’ [every time he wished, 
[he] would withdraw from his senses as if he were dead],36 ensuring that Restitutus 
can be read as having acted entirely of his own will, as having been in complete 
control of the proceedings.37
Yet another way of resolving the ambiguity is offered by Montaigne. In contrast 
to Vives and to Arnauld and Nicole, who, in different ways, bolster the case for 
Restitutus’s willpower — which may or may not be quasi-Adamic — over his body, 
over his fall, his transit, and his return, Montaigne instead further weakens it. And 
it is to that representation of the case that we now turn.
3. The case of the priest named by Augustine
Given the title of the chapter and the string of anecdotes with which ‘De la force 
de l’imagination’ opens, we are primed to understand that the ‘other’ priest, not the 
one in Celsius but ‘another one’, named by Augustine, did not voluntarily transit 
any more than Montaigne coughs and Marie/Germain grew a penis. Montaigne 
tells the story as follows:
Sainct Augustin en nomme un autre, à qui il ne falloit que faire ouir des cris 
lamentables et plaintifs, soudain il defailloit et s’emportoit si vivement hors de 
soy, qu’on avoit beau le tempester et hurler, et le pincer, et le griller, jusques à 
ce qu’il fut resuscité: lors il disoit avoir ouy des voix, mais comme venant de 
loing, et s’apercevoit de ses eschaudures et meurtrissures. Et ce que ce ne fust 
une obstination apostée contre son sentiment, cela le montroit, qu’il n’avoit 
cependant ny poulx ny haleine. (V, p. 103; F, pp. 82–83)
[St Augustine names another one, who had only to be made to hear mournful 
and wretched cries, and suddenly, he would collapse and transport himself out 
of himself in such a lively manner that there was no point shaking him and 
shouting, and pinching him, and burning him until he came round, whereupon 
he would say he had heard voices, but as if coming from afar, and notice his 
burns and bruises. And that this was no obstinate refusal to feel pain was evident 
from the fact that, throughout, he had no pulse, nor was he breathing.]38
Here the priest — or, rather, the man, for in addition to the omission of his 
Augustinian name his profession is elided in Montaigne’s formulation — enters a 
state like that which Augustine’s presbyter had entered, and in which he appears 
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to be dead. As in Augustine, he was not holding his breath, and in Montaigne’s 
version, he didn’t have a pulse either, which we might imagine to be even more 
difficult to control than one’s breathing. And, again as in Augustine, the fact of his 
having left his body behind is conveyed by reference to his having heard distant 
voices. There is, however, no ambiguity here regarding either the sequence of 
events or their logical relationship to one another. Whereas Arnauld and Nicole 
will later avoid referring to other people feigning cries and will thereby downplay 
the possibility that Restitutus is not in complete control, Montaigne here proceeds 
in the opposite manner and simply cuts Augustine’s opening phrase, ‘whenever 
he pleased’. Moreover, the verbal construction, ‘[lui] faire ouir des cris’, has the 
priest clearly subjected to the sound,39 which the restrictive formulation ‘ne ... que’ 
ensures we understand him no sooner to hear than he involuntarily falls to the 
ground. This is not a case in which the protagonist could be read as exhibiting any 
vestige of Adamic willpower.40
As Montaigne’s narrative progresses, however, it appears to gain in similarity to 
Augustine’s, and, as a result, Montaigne’s presentation of the man’s agency, or lack 
of it, gains in complexity. Where a preposition in Augustine could unsettle the case, 
in Montaigne it is the pronouns that perform unsettling work. What they register 
are shifts in agency, in its presence, absence, and location.
Montaigne states, we recall, that ‘il defailloit et s’emportoit si vivement hors de 
soy’, a curious phrase involving a intransitive verb with a subject pronoun, followed 
by a ref lexive verb without a subject pronoun and qualified by an adverb, and a 
prep osition, followed by a third-person impersonal object pronoun. The man’s 
transition from agent to inanimate object is conveyed here in the shift from ‘il’ 
to ‘soy’, and though ‘soy’ is no doubt not as strange in early modern French as it 
would be in modern (where one would expect ‘lui’), the impersonality allows for a 
striking presentation of the lifelessness of the priest’s body. Peculiarly, however, the 
agent of that transition would seem to be the man himself, for the ref lexive verb 
(‘s’emporter’) and the adverb (‘vivement’) ascribe agency to the man, who effects 
his own transit in a lively manner, leaving a lifeless body behind. This would seem 
to undercut Montaigne’s framing of the story as one about a man who is not in 
control. So, is it, in fact, as Augustine might have been saying it was, the case of 
someone able, at will, to transport himself out of his body? And are the sounds not 
causal after all?
The answer to both questions is ‘no’. Although there is no grammatical reason 
to repeat the subject pronoun, its disappearance halfway through ‘il defailloit et 
s’emportoit’ is not without significance. Of course, there can be no doubt that 
the ref lexive verb is governed by the same subject pronoun as that governing the 
preceding verb, and yet not only is it difficult to imagine the man being the agent 
of his self-transport given that he has just been the subject of the verb ‘défaillir’, 
but also, in the absence of a contiguous subject pronoun, the only marker of 
subjecthood in ‘s’emportoit’ is the ref lexive object pronoun, which appears to be a 
kind of halfway house between the subject pronoun, ‘il’, and the impersonal object, 
‘soy’. And so the apparently banal disappearance of a subject pronoun, in fact, 
performs the disappearance of the agent; and the gap between subject and verb, (‘il 
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[...] s’emportoit’), is one into which another agent inserts itself, namely the man’s 
imagination.
Another ellipsis, indicated by a colon,41 marks the moment when the man’s 
imagi nation relinquishes its control and his will returns. Montaigne states, we 
recall, ‘on avoit beau le tempester et hurler, et le pincer, et le griller, jusques à ce 
qu’il fut resuscité: lors il disoit avoir ouy des voix’, a curious phrase insofar as the 
list of verbs referring to actions that it was futile to perform because they would 
not have caused him to come round culminates in a statement that he would come 
round nonetheless, the causal explanation for which is, however, withheld. The 
colon, located at the moment of transition between transit and return, is a kind 
of pivot that transforms the phrase, ‘il fut resuscité’, from being a counterfactual 
into an actual. Before the colon, it is part of an assertion that the man would not 
come round, but the colon has the effect of retrospectively dissociating the phrase 
from ‘on avoit beau [...] jusques à ce qu[e]’ and transforming it into the positive 
condition for him to become the subject of a verb of action once again: ‘lors [qu’il 
fut resuscité], il disoit’. It is undoubtedly significant that at the very point at which 
his imagination gives way to his will again, the word ‘resuscité’ is to be found, for 
when his will is restored, so is an echo of his Augustinian name.
The question remains, however, as to why it was that the man’s imagination ran 
away with him or, rather, what it was about those ‘cris lamentables et plaintifs’ that 
caused his imagination to afford him a near-death experience.42 While Montaigne’s 
ticklish throat seemed to be a straightforward case of suggestibility, this man’s 
suggestibility is of a different order, for his imagination does not make him identify 
with the mourner and begin to feel grief too; rather, the mournful cries cause his 
imagination to make him identify with the person being mourned. He passes out 
as he imagines himself passing away, and his case thus gestures ironically back to 
the previous chapter, which stages another way of responding to mortality, one so 
different that, in the light of it, the man’s response appears comic. That chapter is, 
of course, I.19, ‘Que philosopher, c’est apprendre à mourir’ [That Doing Philosophy 
Teaches You How to Die] (V, pp. 81–96; F, pp. 67–82), and the Stoic contemplation 
of death thus gives way in ‘De la force de l’imagination’ to (what might today be 
referred to as) a ‘hysterical’43 death.
Having re-related the case in we might call ‘non-voluntarist’ terms, Montaigne 
interrupts his series of cases to consider the belief that extraordinary behaviour, 
such as that exhibited by various people in his list, has a supernatural cause. This 
consideration, wholly foreign to Augustine, requires our attention here, for it is 
crucial to understanding the story’s subsequent transit.
4. Transit (de)mystified
Immediately following the case of ‘the other one Augustine names’, Montaigne 
makes the following statement:
Il est vray semblable que le principal credit des miracles, des visions, des 
enchante mens et de tels effects extraordinaires, vienne de la puissance de 
l’imagi nation agissant principalement contre les ames du vulgaire, plus molles. 
On leur a si fort saisi la creance, qu’ils pensent voir ce qu’ils ne voyent pas.44
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[It seems to be the case that the principal credit afforded to miracles, visions, 
enchantments, and other such special effects is due to the power of the 
imagination pressing principally against the souls of common people, which are 
softer. Their credulity is so forcibly seized upon that they think they see what 
they do not see.]45
Here the implicit disagreement with Augustine over whether bodies behaving in 
extraordinary ways do so under the inf luence of human willpower or under the 
power of the human imagination has been replaced by an explicit disagreement 
with ‘common people’, who are said to believe that such extraordinary behaviours 
are caused by a superhuman power. Montaigne’s counter-claim is that just as a 
powerful imagination can wreak all kinds of havoc on the body, so a weak soul is 
powerless when confronted with the imagination, which can impress on it all kinds 
of unfounded beliefs. For Montaigne, the beliefs in question relate to demonological 
activity, in particular, also the subject of the later chapter ‘Des boyteux’,46 in which 
Montaigne will again enlist Augustine:
Il me semble qu’on est pardonnable de mescroire une merveille, autant au moins 
qu’on peut en destourner et elider la verification par voie non merveilleuse. Et 
suis l’advis de sainct Augustin, qu’il vaut mieux pancher vers le doute que vers 
l’asseurance és choses de difficile preuve et dangereuse creance. (V, p. 1032; F, 
p. 961)
[It seems to me that we might be forgiven for not believing in a marvel, at least 
when we can come up with an alternative, non-marvellous way of explaining 
it away. And I am of the same opinion as St Augustine, which is that it is better 
to lean towards doubt rather than assurance when it comes to things that are 
difficult to prove and dangerous to believe in.]47
Of course, with respect to the presbyter of Calama, Augustine had nothing to say 
of any belief, popular, unfounded, or otherwise, that the events had a supernatural 
cause. However, by juxtaposing the case of the ‘other [priest] named by Augustine’ 
and the belief in the supernatural, Montaigne effects a mystification of the events, 
which he then demystifies. This process of mystification and demystification will 
have lasting consequences for the ways in the case will subsequently be read and 
re-related.
5. The case of ‘the priest of Calama’
Over a hundred years later, in Diderot’s Pensées philosophiques, the phenomenon to 
be demystified by means of a comparison with the case of the priest of Calama 
is not demonological, but thaumaturgical. The context is the second wave of 
Jan senist miracles, the first being that of ‘la Sainte Épine’ [the Sacred Thorn], 
which cured Pascal’s niece and goddaughter of an eye infection,48 and established 
miracles as a significant part of Jansenist culture. By the late 1720s and early 1730s, 
particularly in the poorest areas of Paris, Jansenism had become a kind of popular 
movement, sparked by the papal bull, ‘Unigenitus’, of 1713, which had condemned 
as unconstitutional many of the Jansenist beliefs, notably those regarding grace 
and predestination. A key element in that movement was the high incidence of 
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reported miracles in the cemetery of the Paris church of Saint-Médard, where the 
prominent Jansenist magistrate, François de Pâris, had been buried in 1727; by early 
1732, the frequency of miraculous cures, states of ecstasy, and convulsions was so 
high that the police took the decision to close the cemetery.49 When the Pensées 
philosophiques were published in 1746, the affair had not entirely gone away: Carré 
de Montgeron, a notable convert, lawyer, and Parlementarian who had undergone 
a transformative experience on Pâris’s tomb, had just published the third volume 
of his La Vérité des miracles démontrée [The Truth of Miracles Demonstrated] (1745),50 a 
work containing witness statements and other documents, presented as proofs in 
a legal case for the miraculous nature of the events.51 It is in discussing or, rather, 
debunking the ‘miracles of Saint-Médard’ that Diderot relates the case of a man he 
calls ‘le pendant du prêtre de Calame’ [the modern-day equivalent of the priest of 
Calama].52
Where the case had appeared in Augustine and Montaigne as one in a series, in 
Diderot it appears as one of a pair:
Un homme est étendu sur la terre, sans sentiment, sans voix, sans chaleur, sans 
mouvement. On le tourne, on le retourne, on l’agite, le feu lui est appliqué, 
rien ne l’émeut: le fer chaud n’en peut arracher un symptôme de vie; on le 
croit mort: l’est-il? Non. C’est le pendant du prêtre de Calame. Qui, quando 
ei placebat,53 ad imitatas quasi lamentantis hominis voces, ita se auferebat a sensibus et 
jacebat simillimus mortuo, ut non solum vellicantes at que pungentes minime sentireit, sed 
aliquando etiam igne uretur admoto, sine ullo doloris sensu, nisi post modum ex vulnere, 
etc. (Saint Augustin, Cité de Dieu, Liv. XIV, chap. xxiv.) Si certaines gens avaient 
rencontré, de nos jours, un pareil sujet, ils en auraient tiré bon parti. On nous 
aurait fait voir un cadavre se ranimer sur la cendre d’un prédestiné; le recueil 
du magistrat janséniste se serait enf lé d’une résurrection, et le constitutionnel 
se tiendrait peut-être confondu.54
[A man is lying on the ground, he can’t feel anything, he’s not saying anything, 
he’s stone-cold and stock-still. We roll him over one way and roll him back, we 
shake him, we hold a f lame to his skin, but nothing brings him round, not even 
a hot iron can induce a sign of life. We believe he’s dead, but is he? No. He’s 
the modern-day equivalent of the priest of Calama. Who whenever he pleased, to/
at the sound of voices pretending to wail in grief, could make himself so insensible and lie 
in a state so resembling death that he could be pinched and pricked and even exposed to 
fire and burned without his feeling a single thing, until afterwards when his injuries would 
hurt etc. (St Augustine, City of God, Book 14, Chapter 24.) If certain people 
were to have encountered such a subject today, they would have put him to 
good use. We’d have been made to see a corpse come back to life on the ashes 
of one of the elect; the magistrate’s casebook would have expanded to include a 
resurrection, and the constitutionalist might find himself rather perplexed.]55
The designation, ‘le prêtre de Calame’, suggests the figure’s dual genealogy: it 
combines the geographical location given by Augustine with the job description 
suggested by Montaigne, but made much more audible. What we witness here 
is a demystification and a hypothetical mystification: while the quotation from 
Augustine (minus the parentheses containing the reference to the fact that he would 
do his trick on request) makes it clear that the priest’s case involves no supernatural 
intervention, Diderot also makes it clear that, were the priest of Calama alive today, 
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the magistrate, Carré de Montgeron, would mystify his case by representing it as 
one of a man who had died and come back to life.56 Clearly Diderot is mobilizing 
Montaigne’s reframing of the case in anti-marvellous terms here in order to 
undercut the legal and theological case being made by the Jansenist magistrate — 
but what are the implications of his quoting Augustine?
The Church Father is, of course, a major Jansenist authority, and one obvious 
reason for citing Augustine is to be able to turn him against the popular neo-
Augustinians. Yet this is not the only reason. The question of the will is fundamental 
to the case with which Diderot compares that of Restitutus: it is one in which not 
only is the man’s performance a willed act, but its reception by the onlookers is 
wilful too — Diderot observes, we recall, that if the man had been alive today, 
‘certaines gens [...] en auraient tiré bon parti’ [certain people [...] would have put 
him to good use]. The question raised by Diderot is thus not, as it was in Augustine, 
whether the man could play dead whenever he pleased or whether he needed other 
people to play at being grief-stricken first, but rather whether or not, were he 
alive today, he would willingly accept to play a role in someone else’s politically 
motivated trick, involving the pretence that he was the subject of a miracle. Would 
a modern-day priest of Calama be someone who was just having some (somewhat 
masochistic) fun (with some sadists) in the graveyard at Saint-Médard, but who 
found himself unwittingly used as Jansenist pro-miracle propaganda? Or would he, 
in fact, be a willing participant in the pro-miracle propaganda, either by claiming 
himself to be the subject of a miracle or by allowing others to claim it for him? In 
both readings, what is important is that charlatanism is involved, and Augustine’s 
version of the case is amenable, in a way that Montaigne’s is not, to what we might 
call a ‘voluntarist’ reworking, one in which the protagonist subjects his body to his 
will.57 Moreover, the Montaignian framing enables not simply the mystification and 
demystification of the case; it also enables Diderot not only to present the charlatan 
as a priest, but also to suggest that it is precisely because he is a priest that he is a 
charlatan.
That the Jansenists are indeed viewed as charlatans is made clear a couple of 
pensées later, in which we can also hear further echoes of the case of the priest 
of Calama. The sounds of voices, which had been absent, now return, albeit in 
the form of cheering rather than wailing, and we read: ‘[u]n faubourg retentit 
d’acclamations: la cendre d’un prédestiné y fait, en un jour, plus de prodiges que 
Jésus-Christ n’en fit en toute sa vie. On y court’ [a suburb rejoices as the ashes of 
a chosen one perform more miracles in one day than Jesus Christ performed in his 
entire life. People rush along to see].58 The voices function not so much to set the 
priest off, as they did in Montaigne, as to pull the crowd in, as perhaps they did in 
Augustine. However, drawing on the Montaignian frame, while the crowd cheers 
‘Miracle!’, Diderot’s penseur, now abandoning the third-person pronoun ‘on’, and 
speaking in the first-person, recounts:
[ J]’arrive à peine, que j’entends crier: miracle! miracle! J’approche, je regarde, 
et je vois un petit boiteux qui se promène à l’aide de trois ou quatre personnes 
charitables qui le soutiennent [...]. Où donc est le miracle, peuple imbécile? Ne 
vois-tu pas que ce fourbe n’a fait que changer de béquilles?
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[No sooner do I get there than I hear cries of ‘Miracle! Miracle!’ I move closer, 
take a look, and see a little cripple walking with the help of three or four kind 
people who are holding him up [...]. Where is this miracle then, you silly 
people? Can’t you see that this conman has simply swapped one set of crutches 
for another?]59
And in a further twist, the penseur asserts that those who see miracles are not, as 
they were in Montaigne, victims of their over-active imaginations; rather they too 
are voluntarists since they willingly fall for the tricks: ‘tous ceux qui voyaient là des 
miracles, étaient bien résolus d’en voir’ [all those who saw miracles in such events 
did so because they had firmly decided to].60 Just as Diderot’s priest of Calama 
willed himself not to feel anything, so the onlookers willed themselves not to see 
anything other than evidence of the workings of a power beyond their control.61
*   *   *   *   *
This, then, is a case that undergoes a number of transformations as it transits 
from Augustine to Diderot via Montaigne, from theology to law and politics, via 
medicine and pathology. Indeed one might even compare the case in transit to its 
own protagonist, whom ‘on [...] tourne, on [...] retourne’. Moreover, like the prot-
agonist in the cases related by Montaigne and Augustine, who, on coming round, 
reported hearing voices in the distance, each version of the case echoes with earlier 
versions.62 Yet the context for each version is different, and each both calls for and 
confers new meanings and frames. In fifth-century North Africa, Augustine related 
a case involving a performance that replayed the violence done to a convert and 
which, even as it offered a cathartic outlet for that violence, revealed it to have no 
effect because Restitutus, precisely because he was a convert, had a strength of will 
that enabled him to feel no pain. In late sixteenth-century France, in the aftermath 
of a bloody civil war fought between Catholics and Protestants, Montaigne 
presented a case in which the protagonist needed only to hear the sounds of people 
grieving their loss for his imagination to seize control, distance him from such 
unbearable sounds, and close him off from feeling any pain. And in early to mid 
eighteenth-century Paris when the popular Jansenists were protesting against the 
Papal bull, Diderot quoted Augustine’s case in a Montaignian frame, presented its 
protagonist as being unambiguously in control of his body, and suggested he was 
performing a politically orchestrated spectacle — one that only someone who was 
wilfully blind would not see through. A case of a man in temporary transit, then, 
but also a case in both transit and transition across time.
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